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Abstract
This paper provides field experimental evidence on the prevalence and determinants of
discrimination and in-group favoritism in trust decisions. We observe choices of about
1,000 inhabitants of the city of Zurich who take part in a sequential trust game, in which
first movers can condition their investments on the residential districts of second movers.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: First movers discriminate significantly
in their investment choices, i.e., strangers receive different investments depending on the
district they live in. The systematics of the discrimination pattern is underlined by data
from an additional newspaper study, where participants correctly guessed the outcome of
the study. In terms of district characteristics two factors seem to be key for a district’s
reputation: while expected trustworthiness of a district increases in the socio-economic
status it decreases in the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. Observed discrimination is not
just based on mistaken stereotypes but can at least partly be classified as statistical
discrimination. This can be inferred from the fact that, on a district level, both expected
return on investment and actual investments are positively correlated with actual back
transfers. First movers correctly anticipate different levels of trustworthiness and discrim-
inate accordingly. Furthermore, we provide evidence of in-group favoritism, i.e., people
trust strangers from their own district significantly more than strangers from other dis-
tricts. Finally, we discuss individual determinants of discrimination and in-group favoritism.
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1 Introduction
Trust is an elementary component of social and economic life. It is therefore not sur-
prising that economists have accumulated a large body of evidence on the existence and
economic consequences of trust using field data, experiments and surveys. Surprisingly
little is known, however, about whether people discriminate in their trust and if so, what
determines whether they trust strangers from a particular group more than members from
another group. We also know little about whether trust discrimination is based on stereo-
types or actual differences in trustworthiness and what determines trust discrimination
at the individual level.
We address these questions with the help of a field experiment conducted among
roughly 1,000 inhabitants of the city of Zurich. The experimental game is a variant of
the so-called trust or investment game.1 In this sequential two-player game first movers
send money to second movers, which is tripled by the experimenters. Second movers
then decide how much to return. The amounts sent and returned inform us about the
levels of trust and trustworthiness, respectively. Studying trust discrimination requires a
social environment that defines distinct groups. In our study these groups are defined by
the 12 districts of the city of Zurich. We think that districts of a city are a well-suited
environment to study trust discrimination: districts are natural geographic entities, have a
social meaning and are sufficiently heterogenous to potentially justify different reputations
with respect to trust and trustworthiness. Moreover, district affiliation is relevant in
every day transactions, which means that investments observed in the experiment can
be interpreted as a proxy for efficiency enhancing and trust-related decisions taken every
day, such as car repair or hiring and moving decisions.
First movers in the experiment made a contingent decision: before knowing the res-
idential district of their second mover they had to decide on an investment decision for
each of the 12 districts, including their own district. This design feature allows us to
study discrimination in a straightforward way, simply by comparing the amounts sent
into the different districts. First movers were also asked about expected back transfers
for each investment. Second mover decisions were elicited with the help of the contingent
respond method, which enables us to measure actual trustworthiness of the inhabitants
of different districts.
Our data on the choices of first and second movers are complemented by socioeconomic
and individual background information about all participants. The data come from two
sources, the statistical office of Zurich and a questionnaire that each participant in the
1This game was introduced by Berg et al. (1995).
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experiment had to complete. We also use statistical information about the districts and
data from an additional newspaper experiment we conducted in collaboration with a large
daily newspaper in the Zurich area. In this experiment we asked newspaper readers from
Zurich, who were informed about the rules of the experiment, to predict the outcome of the
study. In particular they had to indicate the two districts that they thought would receive
the lowest investments and the two districts that would receive the highest investments.
To guarantee incentive compatibility we paid three randomly chosen readers among those
whose answers were correct a prize of CHF 200. The results of our newspaper study
provide a robustness check for our main experiment. If the newspaper readers predict
the participants’ choices correctly, we have additional evidence that the discrimination
pattern in our experiment is systematic.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we investigate the prevalence
of trust discrimination. We find that investment levels differ systematically across the
residential districts of second movers, i.e., many first movers discriminate. Across districts
first movers expect very different returns on investment and invest accordingly. The
systematics of the discrimination pattern is supported by the results of our newspaper
study. The readers predict which districts receive the highest and lowest investments
extremely well. This underlines that beliefs about the districts’ different reputations
are commonly shared. In terms of district characteristics that determine a trustworthy
reputation, two factors are key: socioeconomic status and ethnic heterogeneity. The
higher the economic status and the lower the ethnic heterogeneity, the higher is the
reputation of a particular district, i.e., the higher is the expectation that a stranger from
this district is actually trustworthy.
Second, we explore the nature of the discrimination process. It turns out that observed
discrimination is at least in part statistical in nature. This can be inferred from the fact
that – on a district level – both expected return on investment as well as investments
are positively and significantly correlated with actual trustworthiness. In other words,
first movers correctly anticipate different levels of trustworthiness and discriminate on
the basis of this belief.
In a third step, we explore in-group favoritism, which is a particular form of discrim-
ination, where people tend to favor members of their own group. We show that first
movers invest significantly higher amounts to strangers who belong to their own district,
compared to strangers from other districts. This in-group bias is not just taste driven
as our data on expected back transfers reveals: first movers not only send more money,
they also believe that fellow citizens from their own district are more trustworthy than
strangers from other districts.
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In a final step of the analysis we turn to the individual determinants of discrimination.
We classify people who invest different amounts into different districts as discriminators
and show that better educated people as well as people who have children discriminate
less, while older people as well as people who favor right wing parties discriminate more.
Turning to individual determinants of in-group favoritism we find that in-group favoritism
is not significantly correlated with individual characteristics, such as gender or age. The
only variable that significantly explains different levels of in-group favoritism is the degree
to which people feel closely associated with their own district.
Our paper offers several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our
knowledge, it is the first to document trust discrimination based on residential districts,
i.e., on a community level.2 This type of discrimination is particular important in light of
the fact that trust and trustworthiness constitute central components of a community’s
social capital (see, e.g., the definitions in Loury, 1977; Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 2000),
which influences a wide range of important economic phenomena, such as governmental
and judicial efficiency (Putnam et al., 1993; La Porta et al., 1997), financial development
and volume of trade (Guiso et al., 2004) or the rate of overall economic growth (Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Knack and Zak, 2001). In this sense trust can be seen as a sort of
lubricant for economic transactions, especially if markets are imperfect and contracts
remain incomplete.3
Second, our results show that trust discrimination can be the result of statistical dis-
crimination: first movers have relatively accurate expectations about districts’ trustwor-
thiness and invest more in districts that are actually more trustworthy. This is different
to previous studies where discrimination has not been statistical in nature. Fershtman
and Gneezy (2001), e.g., investigated gender and race effects in a trust game played
between Ashkenazic and Eastern Jews from two Universities in Israel. While there is
no evidence for ethnic discrimination to and by women, male subjects exhibit a signifi-
cant discrimination pattern, transferring less money to Eastern males than to Ashkenazic
males. Different to our findings, however, this discrimination is not statistical but turns
out to be the consequence of largely mistaken stereotypes.
Third, our findings shed new light on the controversial issue of in-group favoritism.
Starting with the famous “Robber’s Cave Experiment” by Sherif et al. (1961) many ex-
periments in psychology have demonstrated the presence of in-group favoritism even if
2Previous studies on discrimination have predominantly focused on ethnic or gender discrimination,
starting with the seminal paper by Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), who investigated gender and race
effects in a trust game played between Ashkenazic and Eastern Jews from two Universities in Israel.
3In a famous quote Kenneth Arrow notes: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself
an element of trust...”, see Arrow (1972), p. 357.
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group affiliations are created artificially (see Yamagishi et al., 1999, for a survey of this
literature). In recent years many economists have become interested in the phenomenon
of in-group favoritism in trust decisions. Interestingly, the present state of the literature
is fairly mixed. In experiments conducted on the basis of the minimal group paradigm
the evidence in favor of an in-group bias is very weak (see e.g., Buchan et al., forth-
coming; Gu¨th et al., 2005). But also studies based on naturally defined groups provide
ambiguous evidence. While a number of studies find no or only weak evidence for in-
group favoritism (see, e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Glaeser et al., 2000; Bouckaert
and Dhaene, 2004; Haile et al., 2006), there are two studies which report a significant
in-group bias in trust decisions (see, Bernhard et al., 2006; Go¨tte et al., 2006).
We contribute to the emerging literature on in-group favoritism in several ways. First,
we show that in the context of city districts in-group favoritism is relevant in naturally
occurring groups. Subjects in our study use their experience from every day life to de-
termine how much they trust inhabitants from different parts of the city they live in.
Second, we do not only document the existence of in-group favoritism but we are also
able to explain at least part of it with subjects’ beliefs. Investments to the own district
are not only higher because of taste but also reflect the fact that people expect higher
returns on investments in their own district.
Finally, we contribute to the existing literature by studying individual determinants
that are driving trust discrimination and in-group favoritism. Our large and heterogenous
non-student subject pool allows us to do this in a meaningful way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we describe the
design and the used background information. In section 3 we present our results. Section
4 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Design and Background Information
In this section we first describe the details of the trust experiment and the questionnaire
subjects had to complete. We then discuss the design of the complementary newspaper
study. Finally, we describe data provided by the statistical office of Zurich.
2.1 A Field Experiment on Trust and Discrimination
Our experimental tool to measure trust and trustworthiness is a variant of the so-called
trust or investment game introduced by Berg et al. (1995). Two randomly chosen subjects
constitute an interaction group. At the beginning of the experiment both subjects receive
an endowment of 20 Swiss Francs (CHF 1 ∼ US-$ 0.8). One person is assigned the role
4
of the first mover, the other the one of the second mover, respectively. The first mover
decides how much of his endowment to transfer to the second mover. The transfer can be
any amount in steps of 2 Swiss Francs, i.e., 0, 2, 4, ..., or 20 Francs. The chosen transfer
is tripled by the experimenter and passed to the second mover. Contingent upon the first
mover’s transfer the second mover decides on a back transfer to the first mover. This
back transfer can be any integer amount between 0 and 80 Swiss Francs. Given the back
transfer of the second mover incomes are determined: the first mover earns his endowment
minus his own transfer plus the back transfer of the second mover. The second mover
gets his endowment plus 3 times the first mover’s transfer minus the back transfer.
Our design differs in important ways from previous trust experiments. Since we are
mainly interested in discrimination based on group affiliation we add concrete context
to the decision environment. In particular, first movers could condition their investment
decision on the residential district of the second mover. When they took their decision,
they did not yet know the residential district of their second mover. Therefore they had
to make twelve investment decisions, one for each of the 12 districts of Zurich. First
movers made their decisions with the help of a table with twelve rows (see Table 1). The
first column of this table stated the following question: “Suppose the other person lives
in district ... . How much of your CHF 20 do you invest?”. In the second column
first movers indicated how much they invest if the second mover lives in district 1, in
district 2 etc. up to district 12. In Column (3), first movers were also asked to state their
beliefs about the second movers’ repayment decision for each of the twelve districts. Thus
first movers made 12 investment decisions and indicated 12 beliefs, one for each district.
Knowing first movers’ beliefs is important as it allows us to calculate expected returns on
investments and to distinguish between different motivations behind investments. We can
identify, e.g., whether high investments are made in the expectation of high back transfers
or simply reflect a desire to be altruistic.
The instructions also contained a map of Zurich, which displayed the district borders
as well as the names of the neighborhoods in each district (see Figure 1). Notice, however,
that we did not provide subjects with any statistical information concerning the districts’
characteristics. Thus, any observed differentiation across districts is based on the subjects’
everyday knowledge about Zurich.
The fact that first movers made multiple decisions may raise concerns about a potential
experimenter demand effect. One could argue that by presenting twelve options, subjects
were induced to differentiate their investment decisions biasing our results in favor of
discrimination. While this is a potentially important concern we are quite confident
that it does not compromise our findings. First, previous discrimination studies have
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argued against a contingent elicitation procedure because it would underestimate the
amount of discrimination, simply because subjects may not like to reveal that they are
discriminating. Second, independent of the level of discrimination our method does not
induce a particular pattern of discrimination. In other words, if subjects were simply
induced to choose different investments in different rows, the resulting pattern would
not be systematic but random. Even more important, multiple observations for each
individual provide us with valuable information, which is why we chose to implement
this procedure. It enables us to classify individuals as discriminators (if investments vary
across districts) or non-discriminators (if investments are all the same). This classification
is necessary to identify individual determinants of discrimination. The same argument can
be made with respect to our interest in studying in-group favoritism: since first movers
invest in all districts, including their own, we can easily identify whether first movers
perceive strangers from their own district as more or less trustworthy than strangers from
other districts. Moreover, we are able to study individual determinants of such an in-group
favoritism.
In order to elicit second movers’ willingness to reciprocate, we used the contingent
response method. This means that each second mover, before knowing the actual first
mover’s investment, made a back transfer decision for each of the 11 possible investments
(0, 2, ..., 20). Whether this method overestimates or underestimates people’s willingness
to reciprocate is an open question.4 For our purpose, however, the contingent response
method provides reliable information about second movers’ willingness to reciprocate,
which is key for calculating the level of reciprocation on a district level as well as under-
standing individual determinants of reciprocation. Moreover, we are not predominantly
interested in the level of reciprocity but in the differences across districts, which should
not be confounded by the usage of this elicitation method. Finally, since the strategy
method allows for the simultaneous elicitation of first and second mover decisions it also
facilitated the procedures of our experiment considerably.
Our mailing also included a questionnaire to elicit detailed information about socioe-
conomic and individual background of participants. In the cover letter it was empha-
sized that the questionnaire was part of the experiment and had to be completed. The
questionnaire asked about personal attributes like gender, age, marital status, profession,
nationality and number of siblings. In addition we elicited information about the personal
and residential background of participants: political orientation, duration of residency in
4For example, Gu¨th et al. (2001) report behavioral differences between a game where subjects played
a game sequentially vs. playing the strategy method. On the other hand, Brandts and Charness (2000)
and Cason and Mui (1998) report evidence indicating that the strategy method does not induce different
behavior.
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district and city, how closely associated subjects feel with their district and city, number
of phone calls during last week, whether subjects are afraid of crime in their district and
number of club memberships.
In addition to the information collected with the help of the questionnaire, we also
received individual background information from the Statistical Office of Zurich. Together
with the random sample of address files which we needed to run the study, we received a
set of individual characteristics of the participants such as taxable income, gender, age,
type of profession, religious affiliation, number of children and foreigner status. This data
is of great value as it allows us to complement our questionnaire data and to verify its
accuracy. The Statistical Office of Zurich also provides very detailed information about
district characteristics. In the results section we use several of these characteristics, such
as median per capita income, fraction of foreigners or religious background (see Table 4).
2.2 Experimental Procedures
Our subjects are a random sample of the city of Zurich, implying that our subject pool ex-
hibits much greater variance with respect to socioeconomic and personal background than
the typically used student samples. This feature of our data is a prerequisite to investigate
the impact of person specific characteristics on trust, discrimination and trustworthiness
in a meaningful way. For logistical reasons the experiment was conducted via mail cor-
respondence. The Statistical Office of Zurich provided us with address files for each of
the twelve city districts of Zurich. The address files constituted a random sample of the
population of each district. In total 986 persons took part in the experiment (509 first
movers and 477 second movers).
All potential participants received a mailing including a cover letter, detailed instruc-
tions, a decision sheet and a questionnaire. The cover letter informed subjects about the
possibility to take part in a paid experiment, conducted by the University of Zurich. In
order to enhance the credibility that we would actually pay subjects we added the remark
that the Legal Service of the University (Rechtsdienst) guarantees that the study is run
exactly according to the rules stated in the instructions. We also made clear to subjects
that the study was run in accordance with the data protection legislation of the city of
Zurich. In particular, we stated that all data will be used only for scientific purposes
and not given to any third parties. Moreover, we guaranteed that data will be stored in
anonymous form and that any information specific to persons will be destroyed after the
data collection will be completed. We offered participants to send us an email (using a
neutral University email address) or to call us, in order to answer potential questions.
Only very few people made use of these options. The instructions explained the idea and
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the rules of the experiment in detail. First and second movers were told that they were
matched with another anonymous person who was randomly selected and lives in Zurich.
Participants had to complete the questionnaire and the decision sheet, i.e., first movers
filled out the table concerning investments and beliefs and second movers filled out the
table concerning back transfers. Subjects then returned the completed decision sheet to
us, using a pre-stamped envelope. It was made clear in the cover letter that the decision
sheets had to be returned before the end of a deadline, which was about one week after
subjects had received their letter. Among all participants we randomly formed pairs.
Given the district of the second mover we determined the respective investment of the
first mover. Using the investment we then checked the corresponding back transfer.5 In
a second mailing all participants were informed about the outcome of the experiment,
including the district of the second mover, the investment and back transfer decisions and
the resulting payoffs for both players. The second mailing also contained the payments
in a sealed envelope.6
2.3 The Newspaper Study
In order to get additional and independent information about the systematics and ro-
bustness of our discrimination results from the field experiment we ran an additional
newspaper experiment. Several months after we had collected the data from our field
experiment we contacted a large daily newspaper in the Zurich area, the Tages-Anzeiger.
We decided to publish two articles in the newspaper. The first one reported in detail
aims and design of the study. In particular, we explained the rules of the experiment
and the fact that randomly drawn people from all districts of Zurich had taken part in
the study. The first article did not mention any result, however. Instead readers were
invited to take part in a quiz. They were asked to answer the following two questions: (1)
What do you think, which are the two districts that received the lowest investments? (2)
What do you think, which are the two districts that received the highest investments? To
guarantee incentive compatibility, we promised to randomly select three readers among
all those readers whose answers are correct, and to pay them 200 Swiss Francs. Readers
could either email their answers or send them by postcard, within three days after the
article had been published. A total of 281 readers took part. The second article appeared
one week after the first one and contained the results of our field experiment and the
newspaper study. Since there was much public interest in the study, the second article
5As there were a few more first movers than second movers, some second movers were matched twice.
The payoff of these players was determined by the decisions associated with the first match.
6We deleted all names and address files after having sent the second mailing.
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also contained an interview with the authors of the study as well as with the mayor of
Zurich.
3 Results
In this section we present our results. We first investigate prevalence and determinants
of trust discrimination. We then explore the nature of this discrimination process by
relating the trust reputation of districts to their average level of trustworthiness. In a
third step we investigate a particular form of discrimination, in-group favoritism. Finally,
we identify determinants of trust discrimination and in-group favoritism on an individual
level.
3.1 Discrimination
Our first result concerns the level of trust and district specific discrimination.
Result 1 (Trust and discrimination) On average first movers reveal a relatively high
willingness to trust and invest about 66 percent of their endowment. However, trust levels
differ systematically across the residential districts of second movers, i.e., first movers
discriminate.
Support for Result 1 comes from Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows a his-
togram of all investment decisions of first movers.7 The amounts invested are comparable
to what has been observed in laboratory studies and reveal that the citizens of Zurich dis-
play a relatively high level of trust towards their fellow citizens. On average, first movers
invest 13.16 Swiss Francs, which corresponds to 66 percent of their endowment, with a
standard deviation of 7.07.
In the presence of trust discrimination we should observe that first movers send differ-
ent amounts of money into different districts. Table 2 shows the average investment levels
into each of the 12 districts of second movers. These investments indeed vary: the district
with the lowest average investment, e.g., is district 4 while the district that received the
highest investment is district 8.8 In terms of magnitude the variation between lowest and
highest investments is 11 percent. Thus, the mere fact that someone lives in a district with
7Since we used the strategy method to collect the decisions, each first mover made 12 investment
decisions, one for each of the possible residential districts of the second mover. All these decisions are
included in Figure 2.
8These differences at the aggregate level are the result of the investment behavior of the 55 percent
of first movers who discriminate. 45 percent of first movers send the same amount into each district. In
Section 3.3 we investigate discrimination at the individual level in more detail.
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a low vs. a high reputation, reduces received investments by a remarkable amount. In
the second row we calculate the expected return on investment
(
= expected back transfer
investment
− 1)
for each district.9 The resulting levels vary substantially, from 0.15 in districts 4 and 5
to 0.30 in district 1. Moreover, at the district level investments and expected returns
on investment are strongly positively correlated, which suggests that different levels of
investments are in fact driven by different expectations concerning the districts’ levels of
trustworthiness (Spearman’s rho = 0.863, p < 0.001).10
Table 3 reveals that the investment differences displayed in Table 2 are significant for
most district comparisons. This table reports the p-values of Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests
conducted for pairs of districts. In the table districts are sorted by the level of received
average investment. For example, investments into districts 4 and 12, the two districts
with the lowest reputation, are not significantly different. Neither are districts 4 and
5 significantly different. However, from district 9 up to district 8, all districts received
significantly higher investments than district 4. In total we find that out of the 66 possible
comparisons, 51 are significant at least at the 5 percent level.11
How robust and systematic is the ranking of the districts’ trust reputation shown in
Table 2? Does it reflect a stable and commonly held perception of district reputation
or is this ranking rather arbitrary? A good test for the systematics of the ranking is to
ask inhabitants of Zurich and check whether they are able to predict it. This is what
we did in our newspaper study. As outlined in more detail in section 2.3, we asked the
readers of a large daily newspaper from Zurich to assess which are the two districts that
received the lowest and highest investments, respectively. 281 readers took part in this
incentive compatible study. Their answers are shown in Figure 3. The grey bars indicate
the fraction of readers who think that a specific district is among the two districts that
received the lowest investments, the black ones represent the respective fraction of readers
9We calculate the expected return on investment for each single positive investment decision of first
movers. In cases where investments are zero, no meaningful values can be calculated. These observations
are therefore neglected (7 percent of our observations contain investments equal to zero; in 91 percent of
these cases expected back transfers are zero as well).
10Since first movers not only state their investment decision for each district but also their belief about
the second mover’s back transfer, we can also check whether first movers who do not discriminate, i.e.,
who send the same amount to all districts expect different back transfers from each district. We find that
among those first movers who do not discriminate, 37 percent indicate varying beliefs, i.e., they expect
district specific levels of trustworthiness. When we compare this belief based ranking with the one that
results from the differences in investments (see Table 2) we find a positive and significant correlation
(Spearman’s Rho = 0.59; p = 0.041). This finding reinforces the systematics of discrimination across
different districts.
11An alternative way to show the significance of the investment differences across districts is to simply
regress the first mover investments on district dummies (robust standard errors, clustering on individuals).
An F-Test shows that district differences are significantly different from zero (p < 0.0001).
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concerning the two districts with the highest reputation. Districts are displayed on the
horizontal axis, ordered according to the actual level of received investments. Figure 3
shows that the newspaper readers predicted the outcome of the experiment extremely well.
For example, almost 70 percent think that district 4 is among the two districts receiving
the lowest investments and about 50 percent think that this holds for districts 12 and
5, respectively. Almost nobody believes that districts 3 or higher (in terms of actually
received investments) are among the two lowest districts. Likewise almost nobody believes
that districts 3 or lower (in terms of investments) belong to the group of districts that are
among the two districts that received the highest investments. The correlation between
the rank order resulting from the answers of the newspaper readers and actual investment
ranks is strong and highly significant. For answers concerning the two high investment
districts the respective Spearman’s rho is 0.89 (p < 0.0001) while for the two low districts
it is -0.88 (p < 0.001). Thus the results from the newspaper study provide strong and
independent evidence that districts in Zurich differ significantly and systematically in
their perceived trustworthiness. In the next section we analyze potential reasons for these
differences.
Result 2 (Determinants of trust discrimination) Districts characterized by higher
economic status and lower ethnic heterogeneity receive higher investments.
In the social capital literature several factors that are associated with trust have been
discussed. In this literature subjects from different regions within or across countries
are asked about how willing they are to trust strangers. An important difference of this
approach with respect to ours concerns the specification of the group that is supposed
to be trusted. In the previous literature this group typically remains unspecified and it
is not not entirely clear what group concept subjects have in mind when answering the
trust question. In contrast, we explicitly fix the group and ask about trustworthiness of a
stranger from a specific district of the city of Zurich. Moreover, we are interested in trust
discrimination and elicit different levels of trust for different groups. In the following we
check whether the factors that have been shown to be relevant for understanding trust in
the previous literature also explain group specific trust, i.e., trust discrimination.
Some authors have pointed out a positive relation between economic and social sta-
tus and trust or social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Another important factor identified in the literature is ethnic and religious heterogeneity
(Costa and Kahn, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). The negative correlation between
heterogeneity and trust may reflect the fact that each ethnic and religious group is charac-
terized by specific cultural and social norms. The more different norms and cultures are in
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a district, the more difficult it is to build up social networks and trust. In a similar vein a
high degree of mobility and low rates of home ownership have been shown to be negatively
correlated with social capital (Glaeser et al., 2002; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2002). Finally, it has been argued that members of rather ‘hierarchical’
religions (roman Catholics and Muslims) show relatively low levels of trust. In contrast to
the rather liberal tradition of protestant churches, catholic and islamic churches are char-
acterized by strong hierarchies and authorities making it more difficult to establish trust
and social capital (La Porta et al., 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Gabriel et al., 2002).
Table 4 shows how these variables are distributed across the 12 districts of Zurich.
The data is provided by the statistical office of Zurich. Social and economic status is
measured by the variables income and high education. Income is the taxable median
income per district in 1000 Swiss Francs. High education measures the fraction of people
who hold at least a “Matura” degree, an exam that comes at the end of university-track
high school in Switzerland and is a prerequisite for attending university. Our measure of
ethnic heterogeneity is the fraction of foreigners in a given district. As Column (4) in
Table 4 shows, the variation in the fraction of foreigners is quite substantial ranging from
19 percent in district 7 to 44 percent in district 4. Religious heterogeneity is measured
with a fragmentation index, i.e., 1 minus the sum of squared fractions of the following
religious groups: protestant, catholic, muslim, jewish and other. We measure mobility
with the variable years of residency, which shows how long people have lived in their
respective district, on average. For example, while the average time lived in district 5 is
6.7 years, people in district 9 live 11.3 years in their district, on average. The variable
home ownership shows the fraction of apartments owned by inhabitants. Finally, the
variable hierarchical religion measures the fraction of people who are roman catholics.
The two rows at the bottom of Table 4 show how the district characteristics are
correlated with the mean investments into the districts together with respective p-values
of Spearman rank tests in brackets. All coefficients have the expected sign. The correlation
for years of residency is insignificant, all others are significant at least at the 5-percent
level. For example, the richer a district or the higher educated its inhabitants, the higher
its reputation measured in terms of received investments. Likewise, the higher the degree
of heterogeneity the lower the trust reputation.
Table 5 explores the determinants of trust discrimination in more detail. It shows
OLS-regressions where the first mover investments are regressed on district specific char-
acteristics. The dependent variable contains 12 investment decisions per first mover;
robust standard errors (in brackets) allow for clustering at the individual level. Note that
it makes little sense to run multivariate regressions, regressing investments on all district
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characteristics simultaneously. The reason is that most of the characteristics are highly
correlated and there are only 12 districts to identify the effects. For example, the correla-
tion between income and fraction of foreigners is strong and highly significant (Spearman’s
rho=-0.84, p < 0.001). We therefore chose the following estimation strategy. We selected
the two variables that are most strongly correlated with investments, income and fraction
of foreigners, and show that they are highly significantly correlated with investments, even
jointly (see Columns (1) to (3) of Table 5). In Columns (4) to (8) of Table 5 we include all
other variables but only one at a time. It turns out that income and ethnic heterogeneity
remain highly significant while all other variables are insignificant. The results therefore
suggest that economic status and ethnic heterogeneity are important determinants of a
district’s trust reputation. Living in a district with a high economic status and a low
level of ethnic heterogeneity implies receiving higher investments. Controlling for these
two factors all other district characteristics are of less importance.
We now turn to the behavior of second movers. We first study whether second movers
reciprocate the trust of first movers. In a second step we explore the nature of district
specific discrimination and correlate trust and reciprocation at the district level.
Result 3 (Back transfers) On average, second movers are reciprocal: the higher the
first mover investments, the higher are the back transfers. Moreover, the level of the back
transfers exceeds first movers’ expectations.
Support for Result 3 comes from Figure 4. It shows averages of expected and actual
second mover back transfers for each possible first mover investment. The dark bars
show the reciprocal repayment pattern of second movers. It is obvious from Figure 4
that higher investments are reciprocated with higher back transfers. Moreover, the extent
of reciprocation is quite high. Compared to student populations where the returns on
investment are often close to zero (see, e.g., Camerer (2003), p. 86, and the references
therein), second movers from our non-student subjects pool reveal a relatively strong
reciprocal inclination. For example, second movers are willing to send back about 35
Swiss Francs if they received 20 Francs. This means that they almost equalize final
payments. Over the whole range of investments the slope between investment and pay
backs estimated from a simple OLS-regression is about 1.6.
Figure 4 also shows that first movers expect reciprocation on the side of the second
movers (grey bars). The more they invest, the more they expect to get back. They also
expect to get back more than they invest. For example, those who send 20 Swiss Francs
expect a back transfer of 27 Francs, on average.12 Comparing expectations and actual
12This also suggests that high investments are made in the expectation of high back transfers and are
not predominantly driven by the desire to be simply altruistic.
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back transfers reveals that the average level of reciprocation is systematically higher than
expected by first movers. In other words first movers generally underestimate the amount
of reciprocation that is prevalent in the population of Zurich.
Turning to second mover behavior on a district level, we now check whether recipro-
cation varies across districts and, in particular, whether there is a correlation between
investments and the level of reciprocation:
Result 4 (Statistical discrimination) Different levels of investment into districts as
well as expected returns on investment are both significantly correlated with respective
back transfers. This indicates that first movers’ investment decisions are at least in part
motivated by statistical discrimination and not just by mistaken stereotypes.
We know already that investments into districts correspond to different levels of ex-
pected returns on investment (see Table 2). In this sense we can already say that invest-
ments are not purely taste driven but actually reflect different levels of expected trust-
worthiness. In this section we go one step further, however, and ask whether investments
and expected returns are actually correlated with back transfers. In other words we inves-
tigate whether the observed different expectations merely represent mistaken stereotypes
or whether they are actually justified in terms of different levels of trustworthiness.
In order to assess a district’s trustworthiness we aggregate people’s back transfers in a
given district. In order to so, we cannot only use those back transfers that were actually
executed and paid, because even if reciprocal inclinations across districts would be identi-
cal, we would find that districts that receive high investments return more than districts
that receive low investments. Instead we use data from the contingent response method,
which informs us about willingness to reciprocate independent of actual investments. In
a first step, we calculate for each subject the relation between investment and back trans-
fer: running simple OLS regressions of back transfer on investment and forcing the slope
through the origin we get an estimate of a subject’s reciprocal inclination.13 The higher
the estimated coefficient the more sensitive is a second mover’s reaction to varying levels
of investments. In a next step, we calculate the averages of these slope for every district.
The resulting variation is quite substantial and ranges from about 1.4 to about 2.
Figure 5 displays how these district averages are associated with average investments
into the respective districts. The numbered dots represent the 12 districts, the dashed
line is a weighted linear trend. Figure 5 shows that investments and back transfers
are positively and significantly correlated on a district level (Spearman’s rho = 0.67, p
13We also estimated reciprocal inclinations using individuals’ average back transfers for all possible
investments. Qualitatively this yields the same result.
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< 0.02). Moreover, mean trustworthiness of districts is also correlated with expected
return on ivestment (see third row of Table 2). The respective Spearman rank correlation
between expected return on investment and average level of reciprocation on a district
level is 0.7113 (p < 0.01). This brings us full circle: first movers hold particular beliefs
about the trustworthiness of different districts, which determine their trusting decisions.
These beliefs correspond on average with actual trustworthiness.
3.2 In-group Favoritism
A particular form of discrimination is in-group favoritism, i.e., the tendency to favor
strangers who belong to one’s own group. While the relevance of in-group favoritism is
well established for simple allocation tasks (see Yamagishi et al., 1999), the literature
is yet quite inconclusive about the existence, importance and determinants of in-group
favoritism in the context of trust decisions. In trust experiments conducted on the basis
of the minimal group paradigm the evidence in favor of an in-group bias is weak. Buchan
et al. (forthcoming) and Gu¨th et al. (2005) conducted trust games within and across
minimal groups. While Buchan et al. (forthcoming) find some in-group favoritism in
trust for American students but not for Chinese students, Gu¨th et al. (2005) don’t find
any indication of an in-group bias at all. Similarly, studies based on naturally defined
groups provide rather mixed evidence. The discrimination pattern identified in Fershtman
and Gneezy (2001) is not a consequence of an ingroup bias. Both, Ashkenazic and Eastern
males invest less money if their opponent is an Ashkenazic male. In their trust game study
among Harvard undergraduates Glaeser et al. (2000) find that in pairs with participants
from different countries or races trust and trustworthiness are lower, but the effect is only
of statistical significance for the latter. Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) report results from
trust games with small businessmen of Turkish or Belgian origin in the city of Ghent.
Their data does not contain any evidence for the existence of ethnic discrimination or
in-group favoritism. Haile et al. (2006) conducted trust experiments with students from
two South African Universities. While they do not find evidence for in-group favoritism
in total, they observe that low income subjects of both races trust high income subjects
from the other race significantly less. Two exceptions that provide evidence in favor of
ingroup-favoritism are Bernhard et al. (2006) and Go¨tte et al. (2006). The former is an
experiment with two non-hostile clans in Papua New Guinea. First movers in a trust
game transfer significantly more to members of their own clan. The latter reports results
from experiments with officer candidates in the Swiss Army. Subjects show higher levels
of cooperation in a simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma when they interact with a member
of their own platoon.
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Our field experiment offers an ideal set-up to study in-group favoritism in a natural
environment. Since first movers make investments for each possible residential district
of the second mover, including their own district, we can assess the extent of in-group
favoritism by comparing investments into own district relative to other districts.
Result 5 (In-group favoritism) We observe a pronounced in-group bias in trust. First
movers invest significantly higher amounts into their own districts compared to other
districts.
Result 5 is supported by the fact that 11 out of the 12 districts invest more to their
own district than they invest on average to the other districts. Finding this outcome in
the absence of in-group favoritism is very unlikely (Binomial test, p < 0.01). In Table
6 we explore the nature of in-group favoritism in more detail. In the first column we
regress first movers’ investments on a dummy for own district, which takes value 1 if the
particular investment is meant for the own district and 0 otherwise. The coefficient is
positive and highly significant, revealing that first movers systematically favor their own
district over other districts. On average they invest 1.40 Swiss Francs more into their
own district, which is about 10 percent more than they send on average into the other
districts.
It turns out that the observed in-group favoritism in trust is in part driven by different
expectations about trustworthiness. In Column (2) we regress expected back transfers on
the own district dummy. In addition we control for investments. The dummy coefficient
is positive and highly significant, suggesting that in-group favoritism is partly explained
by different expected levels of trustworthiness: for a given investment, subjects believe
that back transfers are 1.08 Francs higher if they interact with strangers from their own
district compared to interactions with strangers from other districts. Put differently,
people believe that fellow citizens from their own district are more trustworthy than the
average citizen, which means that in-group favoritism does not just reflect a particular
taste to favor members of one’s own group.
3.3 Individual Determinants of Discrimination and In-group Fa-
voritism
Little is known about individual determinants of discrimination and in-group favoritism.
Due to a lack of appropriate behavioral data and insufficient variation in personal charac-
teristics of student subject pools, previous work has mainly focused on establishing average
effects. In this last results section we combine behavioral data from the contingent re-
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sponse method with individual background data, and explore individual determinants of
discrimination and in-group favoritism.
We first examine personal characteristics of people who discriminate in our trust ex-
periment. Overall, 55 percent of the first movers differentiate their investments, while 45
percent send the same amount into each district. Those who discriminate are significantly
less trusting than those who don’t. Discriminators send on average CHF 9.47, which is
significantly less than the amount sent by those who don’t discriminate (CHF 17.65). In
columns (1) to (3) of Table 8 we estimate Probit models, where the dependent variable
is an indicator variable, which takes value one if the respective first mover has discrimi-
nated and zero otherwise. All estimation results are based on robust standard errors. In
the first column we regress the indicator variable on a non-linear specification for age,
gender and whether the first mover is an only child. We find no gender and only child
effects but a strong age effect. Older people are more likely to discriminate than younger
people. In Columns (2) and (3) we add individual characteristics that are influenced by a
person’s choices in life. These variables are potentially endogenous and therefore not easy
to interpret in a causal way. Column (2) includes variables on income, education, marital
status, the number of children, and whether the first mover is a foreigner. In Column (3)
we add ideological, religious and attitudinal variables. We find that education and having
children reduces the amount of discrimination, while those who classify themselves polit-
ically as right-wingers tend to discriminate more. Interestingly, discrimination is neither
associated with the time a first mover has lived in Zurich or in his district nor with how
associated he feels to Zurich or his district, respectively.
In Columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 8 we study individual characteristics that poten-
tially explain in-group favoritism. We report OLS-estimates where the dependent variable
is the individual in-group bias, i.e., the difference between a first mover’s investment into
his own district and his average investment into the other districts. In Column (4) the
explanatory variables are age dummies and two dummies for gender and only child. None
of the coefficients is significant. We add further explanatory variables in Columns (5)
and (6), analogously to Columns (2) and (3). Again, none of the variables is significant,
with one exception: first movers who feel closely associated to their own district display
significantly stronger in-group favoritism.14
These results suggest that in-group favoritism in terms of trust is not a particular
gender or age specific phenomenon. Moreover, family, religious or political background
14The exact wording of the question, which we asked in the questionnaire reads as “How strongly
associated do you feel with your city district?” Answers could be given on a five point scale, ranging
from ‘not at all’ to ‘very strongly’. We constructed a dummy, which takes value one if a subject answers
the question with ‘very strongly’ and zero otherwise.
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don’t seem to matter. What does matter – quite intuitively – is the nature of the re-
lationship with the particular in-group. People who identify with their group and state
that they feel associated favor in-group members over members from other groups, even
in anonymous interactions.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we study prevalence and determinants of discrimination, in-group favoritism
and trust and reciprocity across different districts of Zurich. Many people discriminate
and trust strangers from different districts differently. Given that Zurich is a relatively
homogenous city, in comparison with many other cities, it is quite striking to find dis-
crimination even here. We speculate that discrimination is even more pronounced in more
heterogenous cities or regions. Our data reveal that first movers hold particular beliefs
about the trustworthiness of different districts, which are associated with their trusting
decisions. These beliefs correspond on average with actual trustworthiness. This is a
strong result. It implies that first movers know quite a lot about their city and use this
information to determine their decisions. As a consequence, first movers invest more into
districts that are actually characterized by higher levels of trustworthiness. In this sense,
we can interpret the observed discrimination pattern, at least in part, in terms of statis-
tical discrimination. Rather than being only driven by taste or prejudice, many people
in the city of Zurich discriminate on the basis of their relatively accurate beliefs. We also
find strong support for the existence of in-group favoritism in trust. Citizens of Zurich
tend to favor strangers from their own district, in part because they expect them to be
more trustworthy than strangers from other districts.
The fact that people discriminate between strangers from different districts can have
important economic and social consequences, not only for an individual living in a partic-
ular district but also for districts as a whole. On an individual level it is relevant insofar
as many economically relevant transactions involve some element of trust. In the hiring
process, e.g., two otherwise equal applicants may be treated differently simply because
they come from different parts of the city. On the level of districts, trust discrimina-
tion may foster the process of segregation. The Zurich case shows that districts with a
relatively high socio-economic status are also those, which enjoy the highest reputation
of being trustworthy. Since this reputation favors investments there is an endogenous
tendency to reinforce inner city inequalities. Relatively richer districts are trusted more
and therefore become even richer. This process is reinforced by housing rents and moving
decisions. Those who can afford it will move to high reputation districts, again increasing
18
district inequalities.
Our results are also relevant from a city development point of view. The study demon-
strates that policy makers can use field experiments to identify the reputation of different
neighborhoods in a way that is relevant for the citizens of the respective city or region.
Running similar experiments could help identify problem areas in a cheap and reliable
way. It also helps providing potential indicators for future district development, which
allows targeting appropriate policies to specific districts.
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Figure 1: Map of Zurich as distributed to participants
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Figure 2: Histogram of first mover investments
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Figure 3: Answers of newspaper readers
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Figure 4: Actual and expected second mover back transfers
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Figure 5: Correlation of investments and reciprocal inclination
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Notes: Each numbered dot in the figure corresponds to one of Zurich’s districts. The line
represents the predicted values for the mean reciprocal inclination based on a linear regression
of mean reciprocal inclination on mean received investments.
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Table 1: Decision table for first movers
Suppose the other How much of your How much do you
person lives in CHF 20 do you expect to get
district invest? back?
1
2
...
12
28
Table 2: Average investment into districts and expected back transfers
Into district 1 2 3 4 5 6
Investment 13.41 13.30 13.04 12.44 12.50 13.72
Expected back transfer 18.22 17.43 16.73 15.12 15.26 18.15
Expected return on investment1 0.30 0.23 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.24
Into district 7 8 9 10 11 12
Investment 13.74 13.83 12.90 13.68 12.91 12.45
Expected back transfer 17.87 18.17 16.07 17.63 15.96 15.07
Expected return on investment1 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.16
1 We calculate the expected return on investment
(
= expected back transferinvestment − 1
)
for each single
positive investment decision of first movers. Note that in cases where investments are zero,
no meaningful values can be calculated. These observations are therefore neglected (7 percent
of our observations contain investments equal to zero; in 91 percent of these cases expected
back transfers are zero as well).
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Table 3: Pair-wise comparison of investments into districts
Districts 12 5 9 11 3 2 1 10 6 7 8
4 0.99 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.86 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.80 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.03
10 0.57 0.22 0.65
6 0.43 0.53
7 0.89
Notes: The table reports p-values of pair-wise Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests. The units of ob-
servation are individual first mover investments. Districts are ordered by received investments
such that districts with similar received investment are located close to each other.
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Table 6: First mover’s in-group bias
Dependent variable Investment Exp. back transfer
(1) (2)
Own district 1.396*** 1.076***
[0.160] [0.247]
First mover’s investment 1.097***
[0.067]
Constant 13.032*** 2.294***
[0.013] [0.872]
Individual fixed effects YES YES
Observations 6087 6086
R-squared 0.85 0.89
Notes: OLS-estimations with robust standard errors clustered on
individuals in brackets. The dependent variables contain 12 obser-
vations (investments resp. expected back transfers) per first mover
(one for each district). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. We lose one observation in Column (2) due to a
non-response.
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Table 7: Definitions of variables (personal chararacteristics)
Age X-Y Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person is in the
age range X to Y and 0 otherwise.
Female Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person is female
and 0 otherwise.
Only Child Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person does not
have siblings.
Tax Income Taxable income as reported to the tax authorities of Zurich (in
10’000 Swiss Francs). As married couples only report their combined
income to the authorities, we divide the reported value by 2
in case of married people.
High skilled Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person has a
ISCO skill level of 4 and 0 otherwise. The International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) organizes occupations
in an hierarchical framework and assigns a skill level (1 (elementary
occupations) to 4 (professionals)) to each occupation.
Married Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person is married
and 0 otherwise.
Children Number of children of the person
Foreigner Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person is not a
Swiss citizen and 0 otherwise.
Years of residency in city Number of years that the person has lived in the city of Zurich.
Associated with city Dummy variable that indicates whether the person feels strongly
associated with the city of Zurich; originally measured on a four-point
scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly). The dummy takes on
the value 1 if the person has ticked “very strongly” and 0 otherwise.
Years of residency in district Number of years that the person has lived in the current district
of residency.
Associated with own district Dummy variable that indicates whether the person feels strongly
associated with her district of residency; originally measured on a
four-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly). The dummy
takes on the value 1 if the person has ticked “very strongly” and
0 otherwise.
Rightwinger Dummy variable that indicates whether the person conceives
herself as a rightwinger; originally measured on a
five-point scale from 1 (leftwing) to 5 (rightwing). The dummy
takes on the value 1 if the person has ticked “rightwing” and
0 otherwise.
Leftwinger Dummy variable that indicates whether the person conceives
herself as a leftwinger; originally measured on a
five-point scale from 1 (leftwing) to 5 (rightwing). The dummy
takes on the value 1 if the person has ticked “leftwing” and
0 otherwise.
Catholic Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person is a roman
Catholic and 0 otherwise.
Protestant Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person is a Protestant
and 0 otherwise.
Other religion Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the person reports a
confession other than Catholic or Protestant (but not no confession) and
0 otherwise.
34
Table 8: Individual determinants of discrimination and in-group favoritism
Dependent variable Discrimination In-group Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 31-45 -0.027 0.049 0.051 -0.774 -0.722 -0.647
[0.168] [0.181] [0.190] [0.480] [0.512] [0.527]
Age 46-60 0.175 0.213 0.291 -0.593 -0.601 -0.561
[0.188] [0.201] [0.220] [0.538] [0.570] [0.612]
Age 61-75 0.691*** 0.568** 0.551* 0.298 0.327 0.285
[0.219] [0.246] [0.289] [0.606] [0.672] [0.795]
Age 76 and older 0.955*** 0.727** 0.752* 0.509 0.392 0.13
[0.300] [0.359] [0.428] [0.767] [0.938] [1.123]
Female 0.05 0.041 0.021 0.136 0.109 0.047
[0.125] [0.133] [0.138] [0.353] [0.374] [0.380]
Only child 0.113 0.027 -0.02 0.344 0.614 0.573
[0.182] [0.192] [0.195] [0.516] [0.538] [0.548]
Tax Income 0.001 -0.01 0.026 0.034
[0.016] [0.017] [0.047] [0.050]
High skilled -0.362*** -0.327** -0.35 -0.391
[0.125] [0.128] [0.352] [0.358]
Married 0.042 0.035 -0.052 -0.02
[0.150] [0.153] [0.416] [0.422]
Children -0.148* -0.151* -0.047 -0.11
[0.083] [0.083] [0.224] [0.228]
Foreigner 0.249 0.257 0.183 0.295
[0.228] [0.234] [0.632] [0.651]
Years of residency in city 0.003 0.008
[0.006] [0.015]
Associated with city 0.124 0.255
[0.136] [0.381]
Years of residency in district -0.003 -0.007
[0.007] [0.018]
Associated with own district 0.086 1.433***
[0.182] [0.519]
Rightwinger 0.822** -0.226
[0.392] [0.973]
Leftwinger -0.211 0.137
[0.162] [0.447]
Catholic 0.087 -0.242
[0.198] [0.545]
Protestant -0.303 -0.597
[0.190] [0.529]
Other religion -0.161 -0.38
[0.217] [0.600]
Constant -0.116 0.019 0.092 1.713*** 1.771*** 1.712**
[0.154] [0.178] [0.251] [0.441] [0.507] [0.690]
Observations 491 470 467 491 470 467
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.05
Notes: Columns (1) to (3): Probit estimations with robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the first mover has discriminated and 0 otherwise.
Columns (4) to (6): OLS-estimations with robust standard errors clustered on individuals in brackets.
The dependent variable is the difference between a first mover’s investment into his own district and his
average investment into other districts. Details on the independent variables in all regressions of this
table are found in Table 7. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We lose
observations in Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) due to non-responses.
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